The Center of the Universe

One of the most well known philosophic clichés is the question: “If a tree falls in the woods and no one is around to hear it, does it make a sound?” While somewhat pedestrian in nature, the adage broaches a much denser philosophical argument: can the properties of nature exist in a manner conducive to inquiry without observance? This raises a further question in regards to alethic modality: can a world exist without a self-aware being? Alternatively, can self-aware beings exist without an external world? I will argue that the only answer to these questions is no. Without some being who is aware of itself and its surroundings, the collection of matter making up the universe serves no purpose.

Alethic Modality and Possible Worlds

The use of necessity and possibility in philosophic conversation is referred to as “alethic modality.” Philosophers debate propositions about the state of our world using this method of discourse. For instance, a philosopher may posit: “All trees are necessarily green.” By including the word ‘necessarily,’ she has universalized the property of the color green onto anything intensionally included under the umbrella of the word ‘tree.’ This form of discussion shapes part of the basis for most philosophic discourse. Linguists debate the appropriateness of anointing the connection of these properties to one another, but the statement stands. ‘Possibility’ is used for the same purpose. An objector to the previous claim may propose that: “It’s possible that trees can be brown.” This claim is likely closer to the metaphysical position of trees, but the claims stand equally, prior to judgment.

This form of discussion proved to be somewhat limited in its scope. Alethic modality stood as a cornerstone of linguistic and metaphysical discussion for many years. Eventually it proved too limited in scope. In the mid-20th century, several philosophers added to the understanding of necessity and possibility, changing its use for decades. A group of philosophers, including David Lewis and Saul Kripke, postulated the use of alethic modality in abstract arenas referred to as “possible worlds.” Where alethic modality had previously been understood in terms of our world, this new context spread that concept across the whole of conceivability.

The position is easy enough to grasp: for any given world, there are a plethora of alternatives. These alternate worlds represent the outcomes of causal chains within our own and the circumstances resulting from those deviations. Each of the worlds has its own set of possibilities including recursively our own. For the denizens of a given world, theirs is the actualized reality, and ours is what could have been.

Using this semantic method, we may return to the previous claims about trees and adjudicate the validity of their premises further: “In our world, trees are necessarily green. However, there can be a world in which the properties of the pigments chlorophyll and carotenoid are switched. Thus, trees in that world to be brown. Therefore, the claim that ‘Trees are necessarily green’ is false (in a universal sense) as there are some that are brown.”

Modal Realism

Within this realm of possible worlds semantics, there is debate about the ontological existence of these worlds. One side asserts that possible worlds exist merely as semantic tools used for discussion. In essence, two people in discussion about a given proposition create a world through conversation in order to make claims about that proposition. Once the discussion about a set of related properties ends, that world ceases to be. Another side of the dispute emphasizes the actuality of worlds alternative to our own.

This argument of thought was called modal realism and was highly promoted by David Lewis. Lewis rose to prominence in the late 20th century with his claims about possible worlds semantics. In his book “On Plurality of Worlds”, he described and later defended the reality of their existence. He described these worlds as being identical to our own “actualized” world. They exist as equally in kind as our own, only differing in content. They are causally distinct and demarcated from this universe, but we are nonetheless spatiotemporally linked with one-another. Modal Realists follow from Lewis’ example, believing in the physical existence of worlds alternate to our own. We have no breachable connection between these worlds as they exist in logical space, but they are no less real. Properties

The importance of each world amongst all possible worlds in logical discourse is the set of circumstances that are special to that world. Each property or set of properties for these worlds is used in modal logic as the basis for claims in our own world. When I make the claim that I am writing this paper on a yellow legal pad with a black pen, I am making the unexamined claim that I am necessarily doing so. However, it’s not terribly difficult to imagine a world where I am writing in a white notebook, or that I am writing in pencil, or even typing on my computer. Each of these alternative propositions represents a separate world and intuits a separate set of circumstances leading to that proposition. The collection of all properties relating to a given world are collected into a “book” on that world which acts as moderator in discussion of the world.

Properties however, do not alone make up the book on a world. The properties in a given world are related to one another. A pen, divorced from all other properties, has no meaning. Alone, it is an object without purpose. However, when considered in conjunction with other objects, the pen achieves purpose. When placed next to a fish, it is illuminated to have the property of having nothing to do with fish. However, when place next to a paper, a series of references are applied to it: writing, drawing, communication, etc. Each of these referents lead to further connections, and the puzzle falls into place. Suddenly, the pen has an identity, a purpose. Without that network of references, it was an object with no shape, size, or color. When it was given context with other matter, it achieved reference and purpose. Unfortunately, this begs the question: from where do these references originate?

The Necessary Observer

If worlds are merely collections of properties, they themselves cannot apply the references needed to give meaning to those properties. The context must then come from an external observer. This observer is a being with the ability to see the collection of matter in the world and apply recognizable references to it. This being also recognizes its own role within the network of references and this anoints it as the nexus of that network. The pattern recognition also allows base materials to be viewed in forms of potential (i.e. wood as a table).

A perfect example of the relationship between properties and the observer is the video game: “Minecraft.” In this game, the player is dropped into a randomly generated world of hills, trees, and water. There is no purpose to the world and no mission for the player. This is the possible world of potential. The only action available to the player is the rearrangement of matter to suit her needs. Trees may be cut down and their wood turned into tools and building materials. Dirt and water may be used for farming crops. Later, stone and precious gems may be found in caves in order to create more powerful tools and rudimentary electronics. However, all of these references and purposes are discovered and applied to the world based on the player’s role as interloper. Animals exist within this world, but in a purely mechanical way. The player is the only being who sees the potential in the world because she is able to assign the references between materials. This is the essence of the necessary observer in any world.

So what does this mean for possible worlds? I’ve established that a world exists with purpose when it contains a series of properties. However, without a series of references to one another, these properties are meaningless. The system of references only exists when the external observer applies them. Thus, a world cannot meaningfully exist without an observer. Alternatively, a necessary property of all worlds used in modal realist discussion is an observer (rational being) of some kind. Additionally, the rational observer cannot exist without a world, as it exists as the nexus of references, without which it has no self-comparison.

Objections to the Necessary Observer

Careful readers will note similarities between my propositions and others, which have been previously proposed and subsequently dismissed. I also recognize these similarities and will attempt to differentiate my claim from them.

Cosmological

The necessity of an observant being is reflected in the cosmological argument for the existence of God. There, the universe is postulated as a system of causes from one object to the next: global warming melts the polar ice caps, which desalinates the oceans, and heats our atmosphere further. A reflection on the history of the series of causes inevitably leads to the potential for an infinite regress. To answer this regress, some philosophers postulate a “first cause” or “unmoved mover” or “necessary being” for the universe to function.

The necessity of a being for this argument seeks to answer a problem different from the one I’ve made here. I’m not postulating the purpose of the world’s existence. I’m unconcerned about how our world came to be and I’ve already delineated the creation of possible worlds. Necessary beings here serve only as the catalyst for a meaningful world in alethic modality. Thus, the objection is misguided and dismissed.

Idealism

The more threatening objection to my argument is the comparison to Idealism. Monist Idealism postulates that the universe is made up of a single item: consciousness. The world exists upon observance and ceases upon neglect. Bishop George Berkeley advocated this view by asserting the existence of a central thinker. In his view, the external world was the reflection of a consciousness external to his own.

“When in broad daylight I open my eyes, it is not in my power to choose whether I shall see or no, or to determine what particular objects shall present themselves to my view; and so likewise as to the hearing and other senses; the ideas imprinted on them are not creatures of my will. There is therefore some other Will or Spirit that produces them.” Berkeley held that God is an omniscient observer and that the world exists as a reflection of that mind with an infinite number of individual minds participating in the world’s projection. The source of the idealist objection comes in the specific context of “subjective idealism.” This is the contention that individuals can only know sensations and ideas of objects directly, not abstractions such as “matter.” Objects depend on perception for their existence: esse es percipi; “to be is to be perceived.”

The key difference between my necessary observance and subjective idealism is the causal relationship between observer and world. While idealists contend that the outside world doesn’t exist until perceived, my contention is that the properties of a given world exist, but have no meaningful existence for the purpose of logical discourse. When I close my eyes, a caterpillar will continue to crawl along the branch. Possible worlds semantics is merely a tool of discussion of necessity and possibility rather than making definitive metaphysical claims. In fact, it may even be used to answer the validity of the claims made by idealists about the necessity of the external physical world. My argument is unconcerned with the ontological existence of the physical world. Thus, the two arguments serve difference purposes and the objection is dismissed.

Animals

The third immediate objection to the necessary observer argument involves animals. It is implied in my argument that the only beings capable of serving the observer role are rational. Thus, animals would likely be exempt from recognition as serving this role. However, recent epistemic research has proven that many animals have basic grasps of self-awareness and rationality. So the argument may go: simple black and white rationality cannot be the barrier to status as an observer. Thus, more mechanical beings may allow for the actualization of references in a given world, countering the claim that full self-awareness is necessary.

While this is a strong counter-argument, it is once again misguided. Observer status does not require full realization in all worlds. The use of a given world in alethic modal discussion is in relation to a series of propositions posited in that discussion. Those properties related to the discussion may remain in the realm of understanding of a being with limited rationality, as long as it may recognize the qualities being discussed. It’s all relative to the book of the world in question. I may make a modal claim about the solidity of the tree branch outside my window and postulate based on a possible world where it is not solid, but an illusion. A squirrel may then recognize the illusive nature of the branch in that world and choose to avoid it, but there is still a rational observer at some level.

Empirical Skepticism

The first two objections in this section are indicative of a broader problem for the necessary observer. This is the blurry link between the observer and the existence of the external world. Most philosophers with even a rudimentary sense of empirical theory will immediately recognize the problems associated with claiming that the external world (any external world) exists only upon observance. Without a doubt, these will be the same objectors to Berkeley’s Idealism. The necessary observer may be mistaken about her observances of an external world; perhaps failing under one of the Cartesian skeptical hypotheses.

These empirically skeptical objections likely stem from the basis of Locke’s primary and secondary qualities of distinction. He asserted that concepts like extension, motion, and number exist as facts external to observance. Thus, they may be measurable. Secondary qualities exist as part of these same objects. However, these qualities manifest as taste, smell, color, and feel. Hence, they are subjective. So, the objection may go: nature may exist and be adjudicated within the context of possible worlds semantics by way of making claims about objective facts (primary qualities). These facts may be logically observed without reliance on an intermediary for their existence.

There are two responses to the empirical skepticism that are worth noting. The first defense looks to the relation between primary and secondary qualities. It’s true that the former are objective empirical facts and the latter subjective assertions. However, within the context of my argument, the objection is uncondemning. The series of connective references between properties, as observed in logical discussion, necessarily entail both primary and secondary qualities. To make the claim that: “There is a world in which that tree is not there,” requires one to indicate that a world exists that does not include the features of that particular tree. That tree is not only defined by its singularity, but also by its ability to sway in the wind, and the number of its branches. That tree is also defined by the color of its leaves and bark, the smell of its pollen, and the rough feel of its bark. All of the phenomenal ideas are included when referencing “that tree.” Thus, if modal realism holds, a rational avatar must exist in the given possible world to recognize the full definition of the claim and testify about its validity.

The other answer to the empirical objection is that it simply misses the point. There are no claims about the empirical validity of the necessary observer’s observances. She may or may not falsely represent features of her world for use in logical conversation. Such features would no doubt be present in the book for that world. However, the important point is that she is, in fact, there at all. She exists in the world in discussion to recognize the secondary qualities necessary for fully representing the proposition to us here in the actual world. Empirical debates over her perception are at best a moot point when arguing her existence.