It's commonly held in philosophy, as in life, that we cannot truly know something unless it's backed up by some sort of evidence. In philosophy, there is a simple formula used to describe this correlation. It says that knowledge = belief + truth. In other words: in order to have knowledge, one must have a justified true belief. That is, a belief backed by evidence which is found in the real world. Unfortunately this easy formula provides more questions than answers about our understanding of knowledge. The largest is called the “regress” argument which challenges the very foundation of this popular formula. Here, I will illuminate this challenge to the knowledge formula as well as attempt to respond to it in a way which will allow the soul of justification to survive. Unfortunately, we are unable to fly before we can run. So, let us first examine the nature of this, so called, “regress” argument.
The main disagreement with the knowledge formula is not difficult to see if you know what you’re looking for. As was stated before, knowledge requires a belief backed by evidence. However, in order to accept this evidence, we need to believe in its legitimacy. This, in turn, requires evidence which must also be supported by evidence, on and on ad infinitum. In this way, no belief could ever be more than conditionally justified. An example of this is seen in the debate over the origins of our universe. Theologians and classic scientists hold that the universe has a finite existence period, intelligent design and the “Big Bang” theory, respectively. However, a recent theory stipulates that the “big bang” was not the origins of the universe, but instead the resulting explosion from a previous universe’s implosion. Assumedly, that universe would be the result of the one before that, etc., etc.. There are two ways to answer this problem. The first harkens back to the theological/original scientific claims.
One way to answer the infinite regress is to directly dispute the infinite nature of the dependence between belief and justification. Some philosophers claim that it is possible to have firm, indisputably self-justifying beliefs. These are beliefs where no justification is necessary by virtue of the belief itself. These are also called “foundational” or “basic” beliefs. In this case, justification of a belief is not inferred from any other belief but is instead justified by its own nature. The preeminent figure of this Foundationalist approach to epistemic justification is Rene Descartes. In his Meditations on First Philosophy, Descartes came to the conclusion that the source of proof of his own existence came through his ability to doubt it. He then used that basis to build further proofs concerning the existence of himself and everything around him. Doubt, in this case, served as the foundation for the regress of all other beliefs. Foundationalism is a relatively straightforward approach to the regress problem. However, its approach requires certain assumptions about the nature of the relationship between belief and justification that other philosophers will take issue with.
The Foundationalist approach to the regress problem criticizes the infinite nature of the regress itself. However, there is another approach that looks to the nature of the causality between belief and evidence. Instead of the “asymmetrical” model of belief based on justification, this frame of thought poses that beliefs can be justified by several other related beliefs, these secondary beliefs are then warranted by others in a “symmetrical” web of mutual validation. This web creates a coherent whole which itself is considered true. Each time a new belief is added, the set as a whole becomes more complete and the individual belief becomes stronger via support from other beliefs. The truth of a coherent set is based on the truth of the beliefs contained in it. So, if a set would become stronger if a belief were abandoned, it ought to be. This allows for flexibility in the system that doesn’t exist in foundationalism.
Coherentism is not without its challengers. The nature of truth for a coherentist lays in the set of coherent beliefs. If the set is complete, then the proposition it is supporting is true. However, this leaves a gaping hole for what is called the “plurality exception”. This exception claims that there is nothing inherently preventing two different sets from providing support for the same truth. If we hold to the law of non-contradiction then this cannot be allowed. Another objection points to the isolated nature of the coherent set. This claim is that it is possible to construct a coherent set of beliefs that can support a truth which doesn’t correctly reflect reality. An example of this objection is the same used to dismiss the so-called “birther movement”. These people have constructed a coherent set of beliefs (i.e. the Kenyan birth certificate, Obama’s overseas travel on a non-US passport, etc.) which, taken as a whole, present a coherent truth: that Barack Obama is incapable of being president as he was not born in the U.S. There is a significant gap in logic here, but the agent is likely not to see it due to the apparent coherence of their argument.
The regress argument is a daunting challenge to overcome in our search for justification of belief. Foundationalism and Coherentism help us justify the existence of the world around us by challenging the regress problem. Both, while not without faults, allow for new avenues to be taken in the pursuit of knowledge. We can believe in anything we want: God, Santa, the G-spot, a fulfilling, satisfying job requiring no training that allows you to work from home and pays $100,000 a year. However, without truthful, real world justification, these will remain (philosophically) unjustified beliefs, or more coloquially: fantasies.
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